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The New Nationalism 
Timothy Baycroft 
 
 
The study of nationalism presents several complex problems from the outset, not least 
that of simple definition. As a concept, nationalism is both particular and completely 
adaptable: on the one hand everyone knows what it means, but on the other no 
consensus has ever been found around a precise definition which can cover the full 
gamut of situations in which it is clearly at work. Nationalism can be primarily about 
xenophobia and racism; it can be the spreading of high and literate culture to the 
masses; it can be about states and borders, and the quest to make the political and the 
QDWLRQDOXQLWVµFRQJUXHQW¶WKURXJKXQLILFDWLRQRUVHSDUDWLVPWRFUHDWHDZRUOGRI
straightforwardly recognisable nation-states; it can be about identity, the mutual 
recognition of those who belong, and do not belong, to a particular national 
community; or it can be as simple as the quest to give greater glory and pride to a 
particular and universally recognised nation (on theories, see Lawrence, 2005). A 
range of theories have been developed to explain the diversity, the most widespread of 
ZKLFKLVDJUDQGVFKHPHRIFODVVLILFDWLRQLQWRµFLYLF¶DQGµHWKQLF¶W\SHVRIQDWLRQVDQG
nationalism, although more recent work has shown the limitations of this theory, 
particularly for the nineteenth century (Baycroft and Hewitson, 2006; see also The 
ASEN Bulletin, 1996/7). Likewise, no consensus can be found regarding the period 
and places in which nationalism can be said to have had an impact. The perrenialist 
school of thought sees nationalism as a force to be found for many centuries in 
Europe (Smith, 1998), including some looking as far back as old Testament Israel 
(Hastings, 1997), while modernists argue that nationalism is a force which arrived in 
Europe at the end of the eighteenth century or thereabouts, gradually spreading across 
Europe and the globe over the next few centuries (see for example Breuilly, 1982). To 
understand nationalism as a force during the fin de siècle will require a more general 
sense of what the term could mean then, as well as an examination of what 
distinguishes nationalism at that time from the period which preceded it, that is to say, 
what was new, different and particular about nationalism during the fin de siècle. 
After exploring several dimensions of what nationalism meant at the fin de siècle, this 
chapter will then turn to an examination of several examples. 
 
 To cover all possibilities, a nation can be defined as a group of people sharing 
any number of real or perceived characteristics, at least some of the members of 
which are conscious of the extent and the limits of the group and identify themselves 
with it. These characteristics may include any number of cultural traits, such as 
language, religion, dress or cuisine, a sense of the history of the nation (as heroes or 
martyrs), some kind of political or institutional structure (from a fully-fledged State to 
an underground independence movement), and almost all include an identifiable 
territory or homeland. The combination of characteristics will be different for each 
nation, and can grow and become enhanced over time. The potential to conceive of 
the whole membership of the national community, and for individuals to draw some 
elements of their identity from the nation is an important element in nationhood, 
making a nation, in the phrase of Bendict Anderson, an imagined community (1991). 
Nationalism is the word which is given to political movements which create, enhance 
and then draw upon sentiments of national identity and love of the nation in order to 
put a particular group into power or to mobilise support for their political agenda, 
most effective and obvious in times of crisis (Hewitson, 2006, 312-55). Nationalism 
has also at one time or another been successfully combined with just about any other 
political agenda, be it liberal or conservative, authoritarian or democratic, progressive 
or reactionary. It is this very flexibility of possible definitions and potential 
compatibility with a wide range of political circumstances which make nations so 
adaptable, and nationalism potentially so powerful as a motivating political force. 
 
 One of the most widespread notions of nationalism has been that it is about 
EULQJLQJSRZHUWRµWKHSHRSOH¶EXWWKHZD\VLQZKLFKWKHSHRSOe were thought of 
changed dramatically in the century preceding the fin de siècle. From the time of the 
French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century through the early nineteenth 
FHQWXU\µWKHSHRSOH¶ZHUHSULPDULO\GHILQHGDJDLQVWWKHDULVWRFUDF\, and nationalist 
movements centred most commonly around overthrowing absolutism, breaking the 
power of entrenched aristocratic elites, and bringing about some kind of democracy. 
Different nations at this time were the allies of one another, seeking to bring about the 
triumph of not only their own people against the elite oppressors, but that of all 
nations against all forms of absolutist tyranny. The drive to establish democracy was a 
part of a universalist project aiming to see all nations triumph and the use of reason 
and Enlightenment spread throughout the world, paralleling the decline and fall of 
absolutism and the empowered aristocratic elites (see Hobsbawm, 1994). 
 
 By the middle of the nineteenth century, much nationalist discourse was more 
closely LQIOXHQFHGE\URPDQWLFLVPDQGWKHTXHVWIRUWKHµDXWKHQWLF¶YRLFHRIHDFK
particular nation and its people. Understanding folk customs, tales and music were all 
a part of building a fully developed understanding of the cultural characteristics which 
defined each nation, made it special and valued, and upon which a national identity 
could be built and promoted (Baycroft and Hopkin, 2012). Absolutism had not been 
completely vanquished, nor democracy fully ensconced, but the attention and 
objectives of nationalists had already begun to shift. At this stage, differentiation 
between each nation and the precise elaboration of the cultural specificity and 
uniqueness of each gradually superseded the universalist objectives of the nationalism 
of the Enlightenment and Revolution which had been more about the principles of 
VRYHUHLJQW\RIWKHSHRSOHWKDQDERXWHDFKQDWLRQV¶LQGLYLGXDOLW\DQGXQLTXHQHVV 
 
 The fin de siècle saw new dimensions to nationalism and the various political 
discourses about nations emerge as the general political and diplomatic context 
became transformed. The map of Europe had already been influenced by nationalist 
movements, having seen the unification of Germany and Italy, as well as the 
development of nascent nationalist or regionalist movements within the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and elsewhere. The extension of the franchise had brought about 
an era of mass politics, where the electorate was there to be wooed and influenced by 
the various factions competing for political power. Nationalism had already proved a 
powerful motivating factor among urban elites and then masses earlier in the century, 
and by the fin de siècle, rival political elites sought to mobilise further support 
throughout the entire population with their nationalist discourses. Those already in 
power developed systems of mass education which would extend elite nationalist 
FXOWXUHVDQGODQJXDJHVDVZHOODVLQFUHDVHDZDUHQHVVRIµQDWLRQDO¶KLVWRU\DQG
encourage and develop national identity among their populations (Gellner, 1983). As 
the ability of states to regulate, monitor and control affairs within their own territories 
increased, each nation state needed to mobilise more resources to compete with its 
neighbours, as well as use a greater proportion of its resources to influence its own 
population. Much of the development of national sentiment and identity was based 
XSRQWKHFUHDWLRQRUHYHQLQYHQWLRQRIWKHµFKDUDFWHULVWLFV¶ZKLFKGHILQHDQDWLRQVHH
Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983, and Weber, 1921) 
 
 Internationally, the major nation-states of Europe were also increasingly 
engaged in competition with one another. Economically, each sought to industrialise 
as quickly as possible, competing for markets, raw materials, and to develop 
techniques which would give their industries and advantage over others. At the same 
time they competed with one another for colonies, and as the remaining available 
territories diminished, so the competition between rival nations was heightened, 
leading to more than one crisis during the period (see for example Merriman, 2010, 
742-82). One part of this competition between nations involved cultivating and 
developing an ever-greater sense of nationalism among the populations, such that they 
would approve and support further mobilisation of resources in the name of 
competition between states, and to build up the fear of other nations and keep the 
nationalists themselves in power domestically. 
 
 In this context of increasing competition and rivalry between nation-states, the 
nature of nationalism began also to shiIWLQFXUULQJWKHODEHOµQHZQDWLRQDOLVP¶,Q
some ways such a label is simply a sign of the awakening consciousness of self which 
characterised the fin de siècle, coupled with the belief that whatever was happening 
was a part of definitive (as opposed to simply cyclical) change which was a part of the 
µHQG¶WRZKLFKWKH\ZHUHGULYLQJWRZDUGVWKHWXUQRIWKHFHQWXU\7KHODEHOµQHZ¶ZDV
DIWHUDOODSSOLHGWRRWKHUWKLQJVLQWKHSHULRGLQFOXGLQJWKHµQHZZRPDQ¶WKHµQHZ
LPSHULDOLVP¶DQGWKH³QHZMRXUQDOLVP´7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKRVHDQDO\VLQJ
nationalism were conscious  that the developments which had occurred in the area of 
political nationalism were a part of the wider trend during the fin de siècle to  adapt 
old forms into something new and different. 
 
 The new nationalism of the fin de siècle was not only more self-conscious but 
DOVRUHOLHGPRUHH[SOLFLWO\RQGHILQLQJµWKHRWKHU¶µ7KHRWKHU¶ZDVLQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFH
a simple means to refine a sense of the national self through greater awareness of 
national characteristics and cultures via those that were different. By the fin-de-siècle, 
KRZHYHUµWKHRWKHU¶EHFDPHPXFKPRUHSUHYDOHQWDPRQJQDWLRQDOLVWGLVFRXUVHV
encompassing both the external enemy and  also the enemy within. The latter could 
include  immigrants (especially those of other races), the colonised, those of other 
religions(Jews in particular, but also Catholics or Protestants, depending upon which 
religion could be easily exploited as potential national enemies), as well as  the 
potential ³WUDLWRU´WKHPHPEHURIWKH³ILIWKFROXPQ´RUDQ\RQHQRWIXOO\³QDWLRQDO´
Anything which could be presented as threatening the sanctity of the nation as it was 
SHUFHLYHGE\WKHHGXFDWHGPLGGOHFODVVHVZKRGRPLQDWHGHDFKQDWLRQ¶VSROLWLFDOHOLWH
was fair game. 
 
 The nationalists of the fin de siècle were particularly concerned with 
contemporary theories of racial superiority, whether scientifically or culturally based, 
as well as the predominance of xenophobia. The scientific and racial theories led 
credence to the nationalist idea that the particular nation was the greatest, and that 
those from other nations were genuinely inferior. Even within Europe, the differences 
EHWZHHQWKHµODWLQ¶DQGµJHUPDQLF¶UDFHVFRXOGEHXVHGDVDEDVLVERWKWRGHILQHVHOI
aQGWRH[SODLQKRZRWKHUVZHUHµQDWXUDOO\¶GLIIHUHQWDQGWKHUHIRUHMXVWLILDEO\VFRUQHG
as inferior or as enemies. 
 
 The fear of the other, whether of the immigrant or the rival nation, which leads 
WRDFRUUHVSRQGLQJQHHGWRLQFUHDVHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIRQH¶Vown nation at the expense 
(at least rhetorically) of other nations, is also one of the key elements characterising 
WKH2QHRIWKHJUHDWIHDUVZDVRIFRXUVHWLHGWRWKHWHUPLWVHOIWKDWWKHµILQ¶WRZDUGV
which all were heading was uncertain, and possibly worse than the present. Belief in 
WKHµHQG¶PHDQWWKDWWKHSODFHRIDSDUWLFXODUQDWLRQDQGFXOWXUHKDGWKHUHIRUHWREH
secured, and while history might be mined for examples of national greatness, it was 
the present threats and future security and prosperity (if not survival) which were 
presented as being at stake and the most important. In such an atmosphere, 
nationalists were able to exploit the general sense of fear (or uncertainty) by stating 
that their nation was under threat of disappearance (or diminishing importance and 
power) and thereby promote their own agendas when they made the claim that they 
were best suited to protect the nation from the uncertainties which the new century 
would bring. It was also a fear of the disappearance of traditional culture (the 
familiar) faced with a modernity that  would threaten traditional national culture, or at 
least those parts which came from rural and folk traditions. Thus nostalgia for an 
idyllic past of national traditions could be mobilised by nationalists, particularly if 
these traditions could be presented as under threat of disappearing. 
 
 Many of the descriptions of nations at the time began to take on a particularly 
fin de siècle character as well. The language of the psychology of individual nations 
began to intermingle with that of the simple cultural or ethnic descriptive 
characteristics that  had come before. In a well-SXEOLFLVHGVSHHFKFDOOHGµ:KDWLVD
1DWLRQ"¶DWWKH6RUERQQHLQ3DULVLQ(UQHVW5HQDQFODLPHGWKDWDQDWLRQZDVµD
soul, a spLULWXDOSULQFLSOH¶DQGWKDWWRXQGHUVWDQGDQDWLRQLPSOLHGPRUHWKDQD
comprehension of the simple culture, but required an understanding of the national 
character, of the national personality and mentality (Renan, 1882). Nations were 
personified and came WRµXQGHUVWDQG¶DQGWRµIHHO¶± usually what the political elites 
seeking to mobilise support in their favour thought and felt, it is true, but expressed 
very much in the language of psychology associated with the fin de siècle. 
 
 The final general characteristic of the fin de siècle that  can be seen in the 
QDWLRQDOLVPRIWKHWLPHFRQVLVWVRIDµGDUNXQGHUVLGH¶WRWKHPRUHJHQHUDOGLVFRXUVH
about nations. It can be seen that on the one hand nations were still upheld as that 
which brought about, indeed stood for, the transmission of power to the people, 
representing not only democracy, progress and modernity, but openness and universal 
values derived from reason and the enlightenment. On the other hand, nationalists also 
began to use their very discourses of national identity to turn inwards and to make war 
on other nations, to exclude even those who a generation before had been a part of the 
nation, and to prevent those they colonised from achieving equal status within their 
QDWLRQV7KLVLVWKHµGDUNXQGHUVLGH¶RIfin-de-siècle nationalism. Where previously 
QDWLRQDOLVPKDGEHHQDNLQGRISXUHFHOHEUDWLRQRIµWKHSHRSOH¶ZKLFKLQFOXGHGDOO
peoples opposed to tyranny, even when trying to discover the essences of each 
QDWLRQDOW\SHWKURXJKDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIµDXWKHQWLF¶IRONORUHRUFXOWXUHE\WKHILQGH
siècle nationalism was about identifying national enemies, internal and external, and 
finding ways to keep them out or down. 
 
 7KXVWKH³QHZQDWLRQDOLVP´RIWKHfin de siècle  was still a political force 
seeking to mobilise support for nationalist politicians, but with a greater emphasis on 
the fear of the other, on threats and rivalries, based on language that was more 
psychological and that  revealed a dark underside to the positive connotations of the 
mere promotion of patriotic loyalty and promotion of high culture. We will now turn 
to several examples of nationalism during the fin de siècle, beginning first of all with 
France and Germany, as examples of the traditional state-centred nation, before 
turning to the more diverse example of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the 
phenomenon of regionalism that  was a related and increasingly significant factor at 
the time. 
 
France 
 
Most studies of nationalism include France, which has been held up as the archetype 
of state-sponsored and successful centralising nation-building, and was able to 
mobilise and assimilate its diverse population into a coherent nation with a strong 
identity and clearly defined history and culture. It has also become the model of a 
µFLYLF¶QDWion, based on notions of individual citizenship, and a social contract that 
DOORZVWKRVHRXWVLGHWRMRLQDVRSSRVHGWRDQµHWKQLF¶QDWLRQIRXQGHGXSRQD
discourse of ethnic or racial descent (Brubaker, 1992). Such a view among much of 
the historiography of nationalism notwithstanding, the development of French 
nationalism is nowhere near as free from ethnic, racial or cultural discourses as has 
been commonly believed, and the fin de siècle is a moment in time when these other 
elements can most easily be seen (see Baycroft, 2006). 
 
 The French Third Republic prided itself on its universalist, republican 
principles, inherited from the revolutionary tradition that  had begun in 1789. As a 
nation, not only was France the beacon and example of these values to the world, but 
was also characterised by the greatness of its culture, language, history, and its ability 
to assimilate all comers into the home of liberty, equality and fraternity. Paris was the 
leading artistic and cultural centre of the world, and the centre stage of global 
attention during the whole of the fin de siècle. Twice during the period it played host 
WRWKH:RUOG¶V)DLUVIRUWKHFHQWHQDU\RIWKHUHYROXWLRQLQDQGDJDLQLQ
using them as a platform to showcase the greatness of the French nation to its own 
people and to the globe (Weber 1986). 
 
 Behind the the glamour and the glory, however, the French nation also showed 
the signs described so far in this chapter of the changing form of nationalism found 
during the fin de siècle. Having been defeated and humiliated by Prussia in the 
Franco-Prussian war, which saw them lose Alsace-Lorraine to the newly united 
Germany in 1871, the French tried ever so much harder to seek glory. Although 
theoretically incompatible with the republican discourse of liberty to peoples, the 
French conquered many new colonies and tried to influence if not dominate  the 
international scene, along with a renewed discourse of national greatness and rivalry 
with Germany. Along with their more obvious rivals across the Rhine, other groups 
were also targeted as enemies of the nation --enemies from within --  Catholics, Jews, 
and the far left. Contributing to this atmosphere of fear, the 1880s and 1890s saw 
crisis after crisis, where nationalism was prominent among the arguments of all 
political groups seeking to build a stronger nation based on  the fear and hatred of the 
supposed enemies of the French nation (see Baycroft, 2008). 
  The first internal enemy was the Catholic church, accused of having supported 
the counter-revolution and monarchy in opposition to the republic and all of its values 
from the first revolution onwards. The fact that in 1890 the church officially changed 
its politics and proclaimed an acceptance of the republic to all of the clergy and the 
faithful not only did not lessen the charges against it, but on the contrary lead to 
greater charges of trickery and backroom plotting to overthrow the republic in secret. 
The 1890s and the first few years after the turn of the century saw the highest levels 
of anticlericalism and anti-Catholic rhetoric in a century. The church was accused of 
being anti-national, fundamentally opposed to the defining principles of the French 
nation (that is to say republicanism) and the increased pressure of the findesiècle years 
lead through the proscription of monastic orders to the final official separation of the 
church and state in 1905 (Larkin, 1995). 
 
 While anticlericalism was a phenomenon essentially of the nationalist 
republican left, both the right and the mainstream left agreed that international 
socialism also represented a threat to the nation. Although much socialist rhetoric 
within France sought to keep the far left within the nationalist revolutionary tradition, 
the personal and later institutional links to the Second Workers International were 
hard to pretend as being other than dedicated to the destruction and removal of all 
nations in the name of the working class of all countries. Some real electoral success 
by socialists in France in the 1890s encouraged nationalists to continue to keep the 
threat of socialism as alive as possible, and their oppositional rhetoric played strongly 
upon how the far left were traitors to the nation. The journalist and poet Charles 
Péguy warned that if ever France entered into another war, the first thing they would 
QHHGWRGRLVH[HFXWHWKHVRFLDOLVWOHDGHU-HDQ-DXUqVVRDVWRSUHYHQWµWKHWUDLWRUIURP
VWDEELQJXVLQWKHEDFN¶ 
 
 Finally, antisemitism was also  increasing in France during the finde siècle. 
Edouard Drumont wrote his book la France Juive [Jewish France] in 1885; in its 
wake numerous antisemitic newpapers and other writings multiplied through the next 
couple of decades. The Jews, it was argued, were not inherently a part of the French 
nation, but perpetually other, and incapable of proper patriotism since they could only 
prey upon France for their own benefit. Much of the rhetoric was contemporary, of 
course, but they could draw upon the traditional language of antisemitism and the 
image of the foreign Jew (see Wilson, 2007). 
 
 The Dreyfus Affair was the event which draws all of the elements of fin-de-
siècle nationalism together. Captain Alfred Dreyfus was charged and convicted by the 
French Army of treason (betraying secrets to Germany) in the early 1890s, and 
sentenced to prison in far-RII'HYLO¶V,VODQG(YHQDVWKHHYLGHQFHPRXQWHGWKDWKH
was in fact innocent, the army went to great lengths (including forging documents)  to 
see that its initial conviction was upheld and its honour not questioned. The 
antisemitic press supported the army and mounted a large campaign against Dreyfus 
WKH-HZDUJXLQJWKDWKLVµQDWLRQDOLW\¶LQGLFDWHGKLVWUDLWRURXVGLVSRVLWLRQ%\D
political scandal erupted of huge proportions, bringing down the government. The 
result was a great strengthening of French nationalism, very much in the style of the 
fin de siècle, as fear of the foreigner and antisemitism combined to create new flights 
of nationalist rhetoric (Cahm, 1996).  
 
Germany 
 
Although in many respects the historical context was strikingly different, nationalism 
in Germany during the fin de siècle bore many resemblances to that of France. Having 
only been unified in 1871, the first two decades of the united Germany had been 
dominated politically by the Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. The new era at the fin de 
siècle was marked by the coming to the throne of a new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, in 1888 
DQG%LVPDUFN¶VIDOOVKRUWO\WKHUHDIWHULQ7KHSRVW-Bismarckian years would see 
D³QHZQDWLRQDOLVP´DULVHLQ*HUPDQ\HQFRXUDJHGIURm the top (Green, 2001, 298-
337). The young Wilhelm II picked as his first new Chancellor General Leo von 
&DSULYLZKRVRXJKWDSROLF\RILQWHUQDOUHFRQFLOLDWLRQWKURXJKKLVµQHZFRXUVH¶VHH
Kitchen, 2006, 180-5; Feuchtwanger, 2001, 119-29 and Segara, 2001, 209-13). The 
quest to calm domestic unrest was combined with an aggressive foreign policy, 
known as the Weltpolitik or world policy, in which Germany would take its place as a 
leader in global affairs. German nationalism assumed  a new character as well, very 
much in the style of the fin de siècle, characterised by the hunt for domestic traitors 
alongside of the fear of the other outside of the nation. 
 
 Internally, three groups were targeted in their different ways as enemies of the 
German nation (not dissimilarly to France): socialists, Jews and Catholics (see Berger, 
2004, 84-92).  Changes in the laws and a rise in unrest in certain quarters saw 
electoral successes of the socialists during the 1890s, which ironically contributed 
directly to an alliance of former rivals (conservatives and liberals) against the further 
rise of the far left. Socialists, while operating within a national framework, and 
perfectly willing to encourage love of the fatherland alongside of the class solidarity 
of the workers, did oppose certain overt forms and symbols of bourgeois, militaristic 
nationalism (such as commemoration of the victory of Sedan), which made them an 
easy target for the nationalists wanting to label them as anti-national.  
 
 Criticising the Church was in many ways easier, for official criticism of the 
Catholic Church was already well established in Imperial Germany by the start of the 
fin de siècle. Beginning in the early 1870s, Bismarck had waged a battle against the 
Catholic Church, known as the Kulturkampf: the Church had been labelled not only as 
areactionary, opposed to progress, but as fundamentally anti-national. Like the 
socialists, Catholics in Germany were not fundamentally opposed to the nation as 
such, but they did disapprove of the ways in which much of the German national 
imagery included Protestantism as one element of Germaness. Integrating German 
Catholics in support of the regime was important during the fin de siècle, but the 
discourse concerning  the Church itself as at least a potential enemy lasted beyond the 
end of the Kulturkampf in the early 1880s (Smith, 1995).  
 
 As with the criticism of the Catholic Church, a tradition of antisemitism also 
pre-dated the fin de siècle. Traditional religious antisemitism combined with criticism 
of the capitalism and wealth of the German Jews, fear of increased numbers of poor 
non-German Jews from further east, and an association of Jews with the rise of 
socialism, internationalism, feminism and pacifism, all of which made the group as a 
whole subject to being seen as  anti-national at just about every level. The potential 
lack of coherence of the different levels of antisemitism did not reduce its potency, 
nor make the Jews less of a target for the nationalists seeking an internal enemy to 
blacken.  (see Hagen, 2012 and Smith 2008). 
  Unity among the nationalists forged out of opposition to the internal enemies 
(Catholics, Jews and socialists) was fragile, and required regular effort to build and 
re-build. In 1897, the government introduced an overt policy of solidarity, called the 
Sammlungspolitik, to unite the productive classes (agriculture and industry) and to 
EULQJDERXWDGHOLEHUDWHµPRELOLVDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶DQGLGHQWLW\6PLWK
1995, 118-19). The aim was simply to garner support for the government. They also 
used a renewed foreign policy and a targeting of external enemies of the German 
nation as a complement to the domestic policy: this was the Weltpolitik. 
 
 Under this policy, Germany aimed to surmount other world nations and to 
develop a colonial empire rivalling  those of the other great European powers. The 
chief external enemies targetted by the nationalists were France and  Great Britain, 
both of whom were rivals to the rise and greatness of Germany. Their neighbours to 
the east, the various Slavic nations, were derided as backward and racially inferior 
(Berger, 2004, 92-3). Colonial expansion and the development of a large scale naval 
programme would eventually lead Germany into conflict with the other powers, but 
such an aggressive foreign policy was intended in  large part as a means to enhance 
unity, stability and solidarity on the domestic front. Chancellor Bülow overtly stated 
WKDWKLVIRUHLJQSROLF\RIJUDQGJHVWXUHVZDVDSROLWLFDOGHYLFHIRUµRQO\DVXFFHVVIXO
foreign polLF\FDQKHOSWRUHFRQFLOHSDFLI\UDOO\XQLWH¶4XRWHGLQ0RPPVHQ
151). Overall, Germany fits the pattern of the big states in their changing nationalism 
at the fin de siècle. It turned increasingly towards the rhetoric of internal and external 
enemies, as well as  cultivating  fear of these enemies and pride in German 
superiority, as  ways of enhancing internal political support for the nationalists  in the 
closing years of the century. 
 
Austria-Hungary 
 
The Austro-Hungarian Empire provides a different sort of example to the state-
centred nationalism seen in both long-standing France and recently united Germany. 
,QDGGLWLRQWRµ$XVWULDQ¶*HUPDQ-ODQJXDJHDQGµ+XQJDULDQ¶QDWLRQDOLVPVWKH
Empire was home to quite a few other national groups in different states of political 
advancement and popular self-consciousness. During the fin de siècle, the sheer 
diversity of the different groups makes generalisation quite difficult. The division of 
the territory also leaves two different contexts, where Hungary appears more like the 
standard model of centralised nation-building based upon the education and 
assimilation of the population into the single national cultural community, and the 
remaining territories under Austria more tolerant of diversity in a (relatively) more 
pluralistic society bound together by loyalty to the crown. Ironically, it was the more 
pluralistic, tolerant and culturally diverse Austrian system which provided an 
environment more conducive to the development of fragmented national communities 
than the assimilationist Hungarian one (Haslinger, 2012, 111-28). Furthermore, a 
disagreement persists in the historiography as to whether or not it was nationalism 
which was the primary cause of the eventual break-up of the Empire, or alternatively 
whether it even posed a threat to the Empire at all, which was only brought down by 
external defeat rather than internal nationalism (for a summary, see Bideleux and 
Jeffries, 2007, 268-77). Either way, the nationalists would capitalise on the defeat in 
1918 as  the basis for the division of the Empire into smaller nation-states, and the fin 
de siècle was a key moment for the development of the nationalist discourses and 
movements in the first place. 
 
 The key developments in the rise of nationalism in Austria-Hungary were the 
spread of education and the development of written versions of what would become 
the national languages; a longer term development which lead to the formation of 
educated elites in these languages that  could rival the centre; and more importantly, 
at this particular moment, the successful association of nationalism with the 
discourses of progress and modernity. ASince the reactionary, conservative and 
WUDGLWLRQDOHOLWHVVWRRGIRUHPSLUHWKRVHVXSSRUWLQJµSURJUHVVLYH¶OLEHUDOLVP
economically and constitutionalism politically increasingly allied themselves with the 
new elites from outside the traditional German-speaking circles. It was this 
association of the liberal, progressive and constitutional discourses with an emotive 
sense of historic roots in a language community that  contributed to the rise of 
QDWLRQDOLVPDQGPDGHLWVRSRZHUIXO7KH³QHZQDWLRQDOLVP´RIWKHfin de siècle was 
recognisably different from earlier nationalisms elsewhere. As Robin Okey observed, 
progress was increDVLQJO\LGHQWLILHGµZLWKWKHDVSLUDWLRQIRUDG\QDPLFQDWLRQKRRG
UDWKHUWKDQDPRUHDEVWUDFWFRQFHSWRIDGYDQFLQJKXPDQLW\¶ZKLFKDVZH
have seen, is what the nationalists at the time of the French Revolution and in the 
early nineteenth-century had promoted.  
 
 Because of the slightly different political position of the nationalists in the 
Austro-+XQJDULDQ(PSLUHWKHµHQHP\¶RWKHUZKRZDVWREHIHDUHGZDVVOLJKWO\
different than what we have seen for France and Germany, particularly in the sense of 
who was internal and who was external. Since the groups were in practice mixed on 
the ground, everyone was internal, at least to the Empire, and the proximity leant 
force to the tension between them. As with other nationalist thinking during the fin de 
siècle, national divisions were also expressed increasingly in terms of racial 
GLIIHUHQFHV,QWHUQDOµWUDLWRUV¶RFFXSLHGDVOLJKWO\OHVVFHQWUDOSRVLWLRQSDUWO\EHFDXVH
other religious groups, for example, simply formed or were conceived of as rival 
nations. Socialism was still there to be feared as internal and anti-national, but in 
some ways, ironically, helped to promote the growth of nationalism. Socialist 
thinkers, writers and activists throughout the Empire at this time, though genuinely 
internationalist in their objectives, made a point of providing material in the various 
languages, inadvertently supporting the creation of a wider political sphere in each 
language, and ultimately playing into the nationalists hands, rather than the socialist 
ones. Thus, although differing in many respects with France and Germany, 
nationalism in fin-de-siècle Austria-Hungary still bore the characteristics of 
attempting to generate national consciousness among the population and mobilise the 
masses using fear of the other and the threats they represented to the national 
community, which itself was presented as representing progress and modernity. 
 
Regionalism 
 
Just as nationalism in France, Germany and the different minority nations within the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire developed differently, so each of the other nations of 
Europe not specifically covered here had its own story, determined by the specific 
political context of the states in which they developed. Thus in Great Britain, 
questions of Empire and imperialism, DVZHOODVWKHULYDOLW\EHWZHHQµ%ULWDLQ¶RQWKH
one hand, and England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales on the other, gave a particular 
character to the development of identities, and the ways in which national sentiment 
was mobilised by different political groups. Meanwhile, nationalism developed in 
Italy against a background of recent unification, in Belgium coloured by two rival 
linguistic groups in a non-historic state, and in Spain in the context of rival large 
regional centres and a perception of general decline. In each case, the specific 
political context determined the potential for the political mobilisation of national 
sentiment. But they all witnessed some form of nationalism, as a result of the 
unsettling and rapid changes ± political, economic, social and cultural ± of the fin de 
siècle, which various political groups capitalized on for their own purposes.. 
Similarly, the fin de siècle also saw the widespread development of regionalism. 
 
 If nationalism is difficult to define, regionalism is perhaps even more so. A 
region can be sub-national, or group together several nations (such as Scandanavia or 
the Balkans). On the one hand, it may refer to the kind of culturally or ethnically 
defined group that  is simply not yet politically developed enough to be called a 
nation, or that  others want to consign to non-national status, but which does 
constitute the basis of an identity for its inhabitants or members. On the other hand, it 
may imply political objectives as diverse as formal separatism to the desire for a 
greater place for regional languages or traditions in local education. Within the scope 
RIUHJLRQDOLVP-RRVW$XJXVWHLMQDQG(ULF6WRUPLQFOXGHµSDUWLFXODUOLVP
decentralisation, Landespatriotismus, nation-building, cultural regionalism, political 
UHJLRQDOLVPDQGVHSDUDWLVP¶$XJXVWHLMQDQG6WRUP$FURVV(XURSHGXULQJ
the fin de siècle, regions and regionalism were becoming widespread and gaining in 
significance, though they were not always  as widely known or visible as nationalism. 
Visible in the forms of regional societies interested in folklore, festivals, or the 
philology of the local dialect, the development of identities linked to regions at the 
same time as nations was truly a transnational phenomenon, and one which grew 
significantly in the closing years of the nineteenth century. Facilitated by the rise in 
the levels of education, one way to think about this trend in terms of the fin de siècle 
was that it was partly fuelled by the fear that modernity would eliminate traditional 
ways of life (such as local dialects or traditions), and that efforts were needed to 
ensure their preservation and survival into the twentieth century. The local character 
of particular regionalisms was then determined by the particular political context of 
each state, the presence of large regional cities outside the capital, the historical 
legacies of wars and boundary changes, as well as religious and linguistic factors, 
which all varied from place to place. Thus the rise of nationalism in the fin de-iècle 
took place against a background of increased development of regional cultural 
identities alongside of the national ones, some of which would grow into nationalist 
movements in their own right, and which also helps to explain the prevalence and 
power of the national political discourses. 
 
Conclusion   
 
Although more often associated with the whole of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries as a whole, the fin de siècle was adistinctive turning point in the history of 
European nationalism. Its roots were still in attempts made by political groups to 
mobilise support for themselves using emotive national language and persuasive 
arguments  to foster and enhance national consciousness among the population, and to 
associate their particular political point of view with the supposed interests of the 
resulting from the development of mass politics, increased urbanisation and 
industrialisation, coupled with the widespread fear that  was a characteristic feature of 
the fin de siècle as a whole, nationalist arguments proved particularly potent in these 
years. Nationalism became not only a part of the political platform of the liberal left 
and centre, but also of the conservative right, mobilising nationalism in the interests 
of more traditional elites, military growth, colonial expansion and economic 
protectionism. Nationalism also became a factor among numerically smaller groups, 
particularly in eastern Europe, not just of the elites in larger states. Nationalism also 
began to change somewhat in nature during the fin de siècle6WLOODERXWµWKHSHRSOH¶
fin de siècle ³QHZQDWLRQDOLVP´EXLOWPXFKPRUHXSRQWKHIHDURIWKHRWKHULQFOXGLQJ
the internal traitor) than earlier nationalisms had done. Rivalries with enemy nations 
were presented as a crisis in which nationalism was the solution, one that continued to 
operate through the end of the century and into the next. Nationalism would also 
spread throughout the world, as other continents sought to escape the direct control of 
European empires through the creation of modern nation-states after the European 
image, with strong identities, popular support, nationally-defined cultures, institutions 
DQGHFRQRPLHVDQGLGHQWLILDEOH³RWKHUV´ 
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